Mauritius is highly regarded in Africa for its sound governance structures, attractive business climate and promotion of gender equity. Based on data from the Household Budget Survey 2001/02, the present paper investigates gender pay discrimination in Mauritius a decade ago at the mean and at selected quantiles of the earnings distribution. Almost three and the average woman are due to gender discrimination. quantile regressions reveals that gender discrimination is a major explanation behind the gender pay gap in the case of low quantile of the earnings distribution. However, workers at the top of the earnings distribution at the 90 reward to attributes is better for women than for men. The main explanation behind the gender pay gap in the case of high favour of men. The government has a key role to play in the eradication of gender based discriminatory and selective practices which also lead to a sub from an economic perspective. The recent setting Commission is a step in the right direction.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, the world has taken a deep commitment to eradicate all types of discrimination against women. Gender discrimination in the labour market with regard to recruitment, promotion, training and reward constitutes a major blow to the empowerment of women. Recent studies on developed countries have shown the existence o gender pay gap which is discriminatory to a significant extent. The fact that men earn more than women does not constitute discrimination as long as the extra reward to men occurs on the basis of higher productivity and efficiency. Gender discriminatio are equally productive and efficient obtain different labour market rewards for performing the same job. A report by the Women and Work Commission of the United Kingdom (2006) informs that the mean hourly earnings of men ar hourly earnings of men are 15% more than that of women. Women are also concentrated into a Since the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, the world has taken a deep commitment to es of discrimination against women. Gender discrimination in the labour market with regard to recruitment, promotion, training and reward constitutes a major blow to the empowerment of women. Recent studies on developed countries have shown the existence o gender pay gap which is discriminatory to a significant extent. The fact that men earn more than women does not constitute discrimination as long as the extra reward to men occurs on the basis of higher productivity and efficiency. Gender discrimination applies when men and women who are equally productive and efficient obtain different labour market rewards for performing the same job. A report by the Women and Work Commission of the United Kingdom (2006) informs that the mean hourly earnings of men are 20% more than that of women and the median hourly earnings of men are 15% more than that of women. Women are also concentrated into a
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Since the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, the world has taken a deep commitment to es of discrimination against women. Gender discrimination in the labour market with regard to recruitment, promotion, training and reward constitutes a major blow to the empowerment of women. Recent studies on developed countries have shown the existence of a gender pay gap which is discriminatory to a significant extent. The fact that men earn more than women does not constitute discrimination as long as the extra reward to men occurs on the basis n applies when men and women who are equally productive and efficient obtain different labour market rewards for performing the same job. A report by the Women and Work Commission of the United Kingdom (2006) e 20% more than that of women and the median hourly earnings of men are 15% more than that of women. Women are also concentrated into a narrow range of low-paying jobs which do not make the best use of their skills. Women are in general not less qualified than men but the gender pay gap still persists. Research by Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2005) on the gender pay gap further indicates the prevalence of glass ceilings and sticky floors in European countries.
The glass ceiling occurs when the gender pay gap is larger at the top of the wage distribution indicating that there is a limit to the movement of women up the ladder. The sticky floor occurs when the gender pay gap is larger at the bottom of the wage distribution indicating that women are crowded and blocked at the bottom of the ladder. Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) study the Spanish labour market and find that gender wage discrimination increases with the quantile index but as a fraction of the gender wage gap peaks at the 9 th percentile of the wage distribution. The present paper investigates the phenomenon of gender pay discrimination for the small island sub-Saharan African state of Mauritius. The Mauritian economy is currently faced with serious macroeconomic challenges following the end of preferential trade agreements such as the Sugar Protocol and the Multifibre Agreement. As a result of international trade liberalization the export competitiveness of the island which has in the last three decades greatly benefited from preferential access to Europe is under severe pressure. It is thus imperative for Mauritius to have an efficient labour market whereby human resources are rewarded in line with productivity and people are allocated jobs on the basis of merit rather than on the basis of criteria like religion, race or gender. Gender discrimination is counter-productive and leads to economic inefficiency because it implies both productive and allocative inefficiencies in the labour market. The present study seeks to investigate gender pay discrimination in Mauritius using data from the Household Budget Survey 2001/02. Section 2 provides a discussion as to how gender discrimination constitutes a departure from the traditional labour market set-up. Section 3 contains the econometric methodology used in the paper. Section 4 provides some salient features of the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
ECONOMIC THEORY
Traditional economic theory assumes that employers are only influenced by the human capital endowment of employees whilst finalizing the pay. This implies that the personal characteristics of workers such as race, family background and gender should not play any role in determining earnings. This traditional set up whereby there are also no barriers to the mobility of labour between industries and occupations leads to an efficient outcome in that workers are rewarded in line with their productivity. Hence a pay gap is justified only on grounds of productivity and efficiency. A gender pay gap is therefore acceptable only to the extent that men are more efficient than women at performing the same job. Any excess in earnings differentials over and above the amount warranted by gender productivity differentials signals the presence gender discrimination in the labour market.
The presence of gender discrimination implies that part of the earnings differential between men and women is due to the fact that the attributes of men are rewarded at a higher rate than the attributes of women in the labour market. For example in the case of a man and a woman who are equally productive tellers in a bank, it is not acceptable that the man earns a 5% increment while the woman earns only a 3% increment for an extra year of experience. The 2% differential in increment constitutes gender discrimination.
There is also the possibility that men receive a better 'treatment' than equally productive women in some industries and some occupations. Two related factors could explain this phenomenon in Mauritius. First there is the fact that the degree of unionization among men is much higher than the degree of unionization among women. Second and more importantly both industry-based and occupation-based trade unions are to a very large extent controlled by men and could be fighting the case of men harder than the case of women. In so doing the trade unions could be exacerbating the issue of gender discrimination.
A further reason behind gender discrimination in earnings relates to the tendency of employers to prefer recruiting men compared to women. Employers find it more convenient to employ men because there is no disruption to work due to maternity leave and child bearing. This preference for men is not based on productivity arguments and actually boosts up the demand for men and dampens the demand for women by employers. The end result, ceteris paribus, is higher earnings for men but which constitutes gender discrimination.
The above arguments imply that in reality the labour market set-up assumed by traditional economic theory does not apply. Instead men are paid more than women for a number of reasons not related to productivity. Such a situation is definitely sub-optimal and inefficient. This paper attempts to quantify the proportion of the gender pay gap that is discriminatory in order to gauge the extent of inefficiency in the Mauritian labour market. The analysis is performed at various points of the earnings distribution.
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 3.1 MEAN EARNINGS EQUATIONS
Mincerian earnings equations, in the spirit of Mincer (1974) , are considered for men and women as follows. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) quantify the extent of gender pay discrimination by comparing the average working man with the average working woman in the context of equations (1) and (2).
The Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) approach basically decomposes the differential pay between the average man and the average woman on the left-hand side in equation (3) . The endowment component refers to that part of the gender pay differential which arises due to men and women having different characteristics and levels of human capital on average. The endowment effect is therefore justified. The treatment component refers to that part of the gender pay differential which arises when the characteristics of the average man and the characteristics of the average woman are rewarded differently by the labour market. The treatment effect is not justified and reflects the presence of gender discrimination in pay.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is useful but not adequate when the earnings distribution exhibits non-normality or multi-modality. The mean is highly sensitive to outliers and it is worth investigating the gender pay gap at the median of the earnings distribution. The mean also does not capture the existence of local peaks in the earnings distribution. It is thus highly desirable to examine the gender pay gap at various quantiles of the earnings distribution in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of discrimination.
QUANTILE EARNINGS EQUATIONS
The quantile regression procedure [see Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Koenker (2005) ] has gained significant popularity in the recent literature on earnings discrimination.
The th θ quantile regressions for men and women are respectively:
The th θ conditional quantiles for log hourly earnings of men and women are respectively:
The quantile regression equations (4) and (5) are estimated by the Least Absolute Deviation approach of Koenker and Bassett (1978) as follows:
Under some regularity conditions, the Koenker and Bassett estimator has a normal asymptotic distribution. The covariance matrix of the parameters in the quantile regression equations is estimated by the bootstrap method. The j th element of Mθ β and Wθ β in (6) and (7) respectively measure the returns to the j th right-hand-side variable on the th θ conditional log hourly earnings quantile for men and women. This paper applies the methodology of Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) for decomposing the gender earnings differential at the th θ quantile into components. Taking the expected value of the quantile regression equations (4) and (5) conditional on log hourly earnings being equal to its th θ unconditional quantile, the following is obtained: (8) and (9) enable the difference between the log hourly earnings of men and women to be written as:
where
is the gender pay gap evaluated at the th θ unconditional quantile of the log hourly earnings for men and women. Equation (10) , working men and women have relatively high actual earnings Y. These two factors lead to the issue of selection bias whereby the sample of workers is not representative of the population of potential workers. For example, it may be that only women who are highly qualified and have considerable market skills choose to work or it may be that men relatively outnumber women in the labour market because employers prefer to recruit men.
In the context of the mean regression model Heckman (1979) provides the solution to the selection bias problem. This basically involves the estimation of probit participation equations for men and women: The probit equations (11) and (12) are estimated using maximum likelihood and the inverse mills ratio variables
are generated. The inverse mills ratios for working men and women are respectively added to earnings equation (1) and earnings equation (2), leading to the following decomposition in mean gender pay differential: − accounting for the mean gender pay gap due to selection bias. The inverse mills ratios represent the pseudo-residuals from the probit models in cases where labour force participation actually occurs. Thus in modeling labour force participation and earnings, the inverse mills ratios act as a proxy for the unobserved factors that determine labour force participation. For example the household budget survey does not explicitly record the motivation, career ambition, or moral obligation of workers. Such unobserved factors do play an important role in the decision to work or not. A statistically significant inverse mills ratio in the earnings equation implies that unobserved factors matter in determining labour market participation and earnings.
There is little consensus with regard to correction for selection bias in quantile regression models. Buchinsky (1998) proposes to approximate the selection term by a polynomial series expansion of the inverse mills ratio. This approach however suffers from the pitfall that the intercept term in the earnings regression is not identified due to its conflation with the constant term associated with the higher order series used to proxy for the selection bias. Moreover the polynomial terms may be highly inter-correlated. The interpretation of the selection term also becomes less clear with the inclusion of polynomial terms. In light of these limitations, this paper inserts the simple selection term in the quantile regression models. The inverse mills ratios for working men and women are respectively added to earnings equation (4) and earnings equation (5) 
where A θ , B θ and C θ are as defined in (10)
In addition to the endowment, treatment and residual components, there is now a fourth component due to selection bias accounting for the gender pay gap at the th θ quantile of the earnings distribution.
is obtained by an OLS regression of the inverse mill ratio for working men on a constant term and log hourly earnings.
( | )
is obtained by an OLS regression of the inverse mill ratio for working women on a constant term and log hourly earnings.
DATA ANALYSIS
The data for this study come from the Household Budget Survey 2001/02 conducted by the Central Statistics Office of Mauritius. A random sample of 6,718 households was interviewed over a period of 12 months on a range of individual characteristics and aspects, including labour market information. Table 1 provides a distribution of employed people, excluding the self-employed, by sector of activity and gender. Overall the number of men in employment is almost twice the number of women in employment. Men outnumber women in every sector of activity with the exception of the EPZ sector. Table 4 further shows that there are more men than women in all occupational categories.
Monthly earnings, comprising basic pay, overtime and all allowances, were computed for all those working but excluding the self-employed. Hourly earnings were then obtained.
2 Table 2 shows a gender pay gap of 34% between the average hourly earnings of men and women at the national level in 2001/02. The gender pay gap is at a maximum of 54% in the EPZ sector which is the very sector where women outnumber men. Moreover the gender pay gaps in the civil service and the parastatal bodies, which combine to make the public sector, are slightly negative. Table 7 shows that the overall gender pay gap in the private sector is +44% while it is -5% in the public sector.
In the private sector, omitting clerical workers, the gender pay gap increases as we move down the hierarchy. In the private sector, the male professional earns on average 18% more per hour than the female professional while the male operator earns on average 114% more per hour than the female operator. This wide dispersion in the earnings of men and women at the bottom of the ladder in the private sector is probably due to two factors. First the existence of some remuneration orders, especially in the agricultural sector, which are discriminatory in nature. The National Remuneration Board (NRB) publishes every year remuneration orders which specify the minimum wages of private sector workers who are employed at or below the clerical level with a view to protecting such workers from employer exploitation. In 2001/02, there were 27 remuneration orders and each one specified the minimum wages applying to workers in a sector of activity by experience and (sometimes) gender. While the experience dimension is acceptable from a human capital point of view, the gender dimension constitutes discrimination. For example, the daily minimum wages applying to a male field worker in the sugar industry in 2001/02 was Rs.155.22 while it was Rs.115.16 in the case of a female field worker. The 35% pay gap due to gender is in principle discriminatory. A second factor that could be responsible for the wide dispersion in earnings of men and women at the bottom of the ladder in the private sector relates to unionization. In Mauritius, men are indeed over-represented at both the levels of management and membership in trade unions and this could reasonably be expected to contribute in further enhancing the gender pay gap in the private sector.
The conditions of work and remuneration in the public sector are dictated by the Pay Research Bureau (PRB), which publishes its report every five years. The latest PRB report dates back to 2003. The pay structure in the public sector as per the PRB report is based on transparent salary bands and applies to all public officers on permanent establishment. The salary bands account for the experience of the officer within a grade and importantly there is no room for a gender dimension. The salaries of public officers do not depend on sector of activity while the salaries of private sector workers do. For example, a clerical officer in the public sector would enjoy the same salary regardless of which ministry s/he is posted to. Whereas, in accordance with the NRB remuneration orders, a clerical officer in the private sector has the right to different minimum wages depending on the industry s/he is working in. Men earned on average 5% less than women in the public sector in 2001/02. This could be to some extent explained by Table 3 , which shows that the average female public officer is more educated than the average male public officer.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Mincerian earnings equations are in this section estimated both at the mean and at the 10 th and 90 th quantiles of the log hourly earnings distribution. Educational attainment, work experience, occupational category and sector of activity are included as independent variables in the mincerian equations. Educational attainment is measured as years of education. The work experience measure used is that of potential labour market experience given that the survey does not contain employment histories. The work experience variable is also included in quadratic form so that the effect of additional work experience on earnings is allowed to vary over the employment life of the worker. Typically it has been found that there are diminishing returns to additional work experience. The occupational groups are included as dummy variables categorized as Professional, Associate Professional, Clerical, Craft and Operators with Elementary workers as the base category. The institutional sectors are also included as dummy variables categorized as Civil Service, Parastatal, Sugar, Other Private and Informal with EPZ sector as base category. The sample of workers amounts to 7,633 and comprises 5,024 men and 2,609 women. The kernel densities of the log hourly earnings of men and women are plotted in Figure 1 . The kernel density for men lies to the right of the kernel density for women. The cumulative distribution functions of the log hourly earnings of men and women appear in Figure 2 . The horizontal distance between the CDF for men and women is a measure of the gender pay gap at the th θ quantile of the log hourly earnings distributions. Figure 3 explicitly plots the gender gap in log hourly earnings at different quantiles and exhibits two interesting features. First the gender pay gap up to the median is much higher than the gender pay gap beyond the median. Second the gender pay gap declines monotonically beyond the median. This indicates the presence of sticky floors rather than glass ceilings in that the gender earnings gap at the bottom of the ladder is higher than at the top of the ladder. The gender pay gap in log hourly earnings is 0.44 at the 10 th quantile, 0.36 at the mean and 0.14 at the 90 th quantile. Such wide variation in the gender pay gap requires that the investigation of discrimination be carried out at various points of the earnings distribution in addition to the mean. We start with the mean.
DECOMPOSITION OF GENDER EARNINGS GAP AT THE MEAN
The mincerian earnings equations for men and women, respectively equations (1) and (2), are reported both with and without correction for selection bias. A general-to-specific stepwise estimation approach is applied whereby independent variables that are not individually significant at the 10% level are dropped from the model. The resulting earnings equations appear in Table 9 . Two points are however worth mentioning before we comment on these results.
First a pooled regression combining men and women and including a gender dummy interacted with the explanatory variables was run to find out whether or not separate earnings regressions should be estimated for men and women. The null hypothesis of a pooled regression was strongly rejected at the 1% significance level [Computed F = 39.9 and Critical F ≈ 2.04 with df = (14, 7605)] in favour of separate gender regressions. This indicates the presence of segmented labour markets for men and women in Mauritius.
Second the estimation of probit participation equations was undertaken in order to compute the inverse mills ratio and correct for selection bias. The sample included individuals aged 16 -60, comprising 6,886 men and 8,184 women. Table 8 shows that the probability that a man works increases as he gets married and as he has small children, reflecting his financial obligations. Ceteris paribus, the probability of a married man working is 43% higher than the probability of a non-married man working. A woman is more likely to work when she is married and when she is the head of the family, reflecting her financial obligations. However the woman is less likely to work when she has small children aged 0 -5, reflecting her childrearing duty. Ceteris paribus, the probability of a woman working falls by 5% when she has small children aged 0 -5. Both men and women are more likely to work when they acquire additional education.
3 The inverse mills ratio was computed for men and women using the methodology outlined above.
We are now in a position to elaborate on the findings in Table 9 . Statistically significant inverse mills ratios in both the men and women earnings regressions imply that unobserved factors play an important role in labour force participation and earnings. We shall therefore comment on the earnings equations corrected for selection bias (denoted as 'Corrected'). Educational attainment, work experience, sector of activity and occupational group are all important determinants of earnings. The hourly earnings of the average man increases by 5.5% and that of the average woman by 6% with an extra year of education. Both men and women earn more with experience but diminishing returns apply. The inverse mills ratios have a negative coefficient in the earnings regressions for both men and women. This could be explained by the existence of moral obligations which are unobserved but which have a strong effect in pushing men and women into work thereby making them accept reduced earnings. The negative effects on earnings of these moral obligations are three times stronger on men than on women, as depicted by the inverse mills ratio coefficients. This is not much surprising given that the family structure in Mauritius is basically patriarchal whereby men are the main breadwinner and thus have a strong moral obligation to work and even accept earnings which are low relative to their qualifications and experience.
Decomposition of the gender pay gap at the mean of log hourly earnings by applying the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) methodology is reported in Table 12 . It is interesting to note that 71.5% (almost three-quarter) of the gender pay gap between the average man and the average woman in Mauritius in 2001/02 is due to discrimination. Only 25.6% (about one quarter) of the gender pay gap is justified on the basis of men being more productive than women. A selection effect was present but minor (amounting to 2.8%). These figures are highly revealing on the existence of gender discrimination in the Mauritian labour market. However since the 'mean' masks a lot of important information we go deeper into an analysis at different quantiles in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of gender discrimination along the earnings ladder.
DECOMPOSITION OF GENDER EARNINGS GAP AT QUANTILES
The quantile earnings equations for men and women, respectively equations (4) and (5), are reported both with and without correction for selection bias. A general-to-specific stepwise estimation approach is applied whereby independent variables that are not individually significant at the 10% level are dropped from the model. The resulting earnings equations, where correction is made for selection bias, appear in Table 11 .
5 Educational attainment, work experience, sector of activity and occupational group are all important determinants of earnings at different quantiles. Women are rewarded slightly more than men for an extra year of education at all quantiles. Selection bias, as in the mean regressions, affects men more than women since the inverse mills ratio is statistically significant at all quantiles for men but at only the 90 th quantile for women. For men the inverse mills ratio coefficients are significant and negative at all quantiles. This could again be highlighting the important role that unobserved moral obligations play in the patriarchal family structure of Mauritius whereby men at all levels are pushed to work and accept earnings below those warranted by their qualifications and experience. For women the inverse mills ratio coefficient is significant (and negative) only at the 90 th quantile.
This potentially reflects the unobserved career ambition of high-earnings women which in turn increases their likelihood of working but at the same time forces them to accept earnings below those warranted by their qualifications and experience. Decomposition of the gender pay gap at different quantiles of the log hourly earnings distribution by applying the Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) methodology is reported in Table  13 . We focus on the 'Corrected' results given the presence of selection bias for men at all quantiles. 6 The pattern of the endowment component implies that men are more productive than women between the 10 th -75 th quantiles but women are more productive than men at the 90 th quantile. Thus high-earnings women are better endowed than high-earnings men. The treatment component depicts a somehow similar pattern to that of the endowment component. The evidence on the treatment component points to the existence of significant gender discrimination between the 10 th -75 th quantiles, in that the treatment component ranges between 87% and 121% of the actual gender pay gap. However the treatment component goes down to -55% at the 90 th quantile indicating reverse gender discrimination at the upper end of the earnings ladder. This could be explained by the fact that high-earnings women who are better endowed than their male counterparts are in a position to bargain for a better reward to their attributes. The selection component is negative between the 10 th -75 th quantiles ranging between -18% and -33% of the actual gender pay gap. This could be as a result of the moral obligation of men to accept work at earnings rates which are below the levels warranted by their qualifications and experience, thereby contributing to reduce the gender pay gap. However the selection component is highly positive at 155% of the actual gender pay gap at the 90 th quantile.
Bearing in mind that the inverse mills ratios for the case of men and women at the 90 th quantile have basically the same coefficient of about -0.30, the main reason for this finding is that the expected value of the inverse mills ratio is higher for women (about 0.95) than for men (about 0.21). That is, unobserved factors are more important in inducing high-earnings women than high-earnings men to work. In line with the explanation given above, this would mean that the career ambition of high-earnings women has a stronger effect than the moral obligation of highearnings men on the likelihood of working. These unobserved factors reduce earnings for both men and women at the 90 th quantile, but high-earnings women suffer a greater reduction in earnings relative to qualifications and experience than high-earnings men. This mechanism increases the gender pay gap at the 90 th quantile. A further argument relating to the preference of employers to select men rather than women for high-earnings jobs could explain the selection effect of 155% at the 90 th quantile. This latter argument holds truth given that men by far outnumber women in decision-taking jobs in Mauritius. The residual component suggests the presence of unexplained differences in gender earnings at the different quantiles, the more so at the 75 th and 90 th quantiles.
CONCLUSION
This paper shows the existence of gender discrimination in the Mauritian labour market in 2001/02. Almost three-quarter of the difference in the earnings of the average man and the average woman is discriminatory and thus not justified on economic grounds. A deeper analysis using quantile regressions shows that gender discrimination in pay is not uniform across the earnings ladder. For low-earnings workers at the bottom of the ladder to medium-earnings workers at the 75 th percentile of the ladder, discrimination constitutes the major component of the gender pay gap. At the 10 th and 75 th quantiles, the gender discrimination component even amounts to more than the actual gender pay gap. In contrast we find a reverse gender discrimination component at the 90 th quantile implying that high-earnings women are rewarded better than high-earnings men for their attributes. A plausible explanation being that high-earnings women who are also found to be better endowed than high-earnings men are able to negotiate for a better return to their attributes. We also find the presence of a significant selection component in the gender earnings gap across the ladder, which in turn justifies correction for selection bias. The selection component is negative from the 10 th -75 th quantiles thereby contributing to reduce the gender pay gap for low-earnings to medium-earnings workers. This is explained in terms of the moral obligation for men to work and thus accept earnings that are below what they would earn in line with their qualifications and experience. However the selection component is positive and even exceeds the actual gender pay gap at the 90 th quantile, thereby contributing to increase the gender pay gap for highearnings workers. This is explained in terms of the career ambition of high-earnings women who by their very eagerness to work are brought to accept earnings that are below what they would earn in line with their qualifications and experience. A further potential explanation relates to the preference of employers to select men instead of women for high-earnings jobs. The findings in this paper overall imply that gender discrimination in earnings in Mauritius in 2001/02 was more of an issue for low-earnings to mid-earnings workers than for high-earnings workers in accounting for the gender pay gap. For high-earnings workers, reverse gender discrimination and a selection bias strongly in favour of men were pertinent issues in accounting for the gender pay gap. The government thus has a key role to play in order to get rid of gender-based discriminatory and selective practices which lead to a sub-optimal allocation of resources from an economic perspective. The recent adoption of an Equal Opportunities Act in Mauritius constitutes an important step in the fight against discrimination. Future research could investigate the more recent Household Budget Surveys of 2006/07 and 2011/12 so that an accurate picture of the evolution of gender pay discrimination could be obtained, to enable policymakers take appropriate measures. 
Notes:
• Base Category is Elementary for occupation and EPZ for the institutional sector.
• General-to-specific modeling was applied to the equatio significant at 10% level • General-to-specific modeling was applied to the equations. All remaining variables are significant at 10% level. Gender Pay Gap at the mean of log hourly earnings = 0.363 2010 -2013 
